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Remedial Discretion in Constitutional
Adjudication
JOHN M. GREABE†
INTRODUCTION
Three Terms ago, in Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court
upheld an injunction ordering the State of California to
release approximately 46,000 convicts within two years.1 The
injunction rested on a determination that overcrowding was
causing two classes of California inmates with serious health
issues to be deprived of the constitutionally adequate health
care guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.2 The Court was bitterly divided over the
propriety of the injunction; separate dissents by Justices
Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) and Alito (joined by Chief
Justice Roberts) blasted the majority for, as Justice Scalia
colorfully put it, failing to “bend every effort to read the law
in such a way as to avoid that outrageous result.”3 But none
of the dissenting Justices took issue with the premise that
relief was obligatory once the plaintiffs had established an
ongoing constitutional violation.4

1. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923, 1928 (2011).
2. See id. at 1922.
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3. Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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4. The majority repeatedly noted the necessity of an award of relief in such
circumstances. See id. at 1923, 1928-29, 1937, 1939, 1941-42, 1946-47. Justice
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The absence of disagreement over this premise is
interesting. Most would view a prisoner release as harmful
to the public interest, and courts have historically exercised
a broad discretion to withhold equitable remedies that
threaten the public interest.5 Indeed, the Supreme Court and
Congress—but the Court in particular—have developed a
number of doctrines that, in the name of the public interest,
withhold remedies from persons who have asserted
justiciable and meritorious claims of constitutional right.
Think here of the various non-retroactivity doctrines that the
Court formerly applied in both the criminal6 and civil
contexts.7 Or of the Teague v. Lane doctrine8—a rule still
unhelpfully described in terms of non-retroactivity9—which
severely limits the availability of relief on collateral review

Scalia proceeded from the same assumption, but only if an individual prisoner
were to establish that he is “suffering from a violation of his constitutional rights,
and that his release, and no other relief, will remedy that violation.” Id. at 195758 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Alito, like Justice Scalia, assumed that relief
should follow so long as the remedial order is exactly tailored to a proven
constitutional violation. See id. at 1960 (Alito, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816 (2010); Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).

7. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 178-83 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). Civil non-retroactivity doctrine has been
moribund since the Court decided Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86
(1993).
8. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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9. See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013) (holding
that, under “principles set out in Teague,” a recent decision extending the scope
of the Sixth Amendment “does not have retroactive effect.”). The Court should
stop using the rhetoric of “non-retroactivity,” which implies (incorrectly) that
current constitutional understandings do not “apply” on collateral review. See
infra Part I.A. Instead, it should describe Teague in terms of how it functions: as
a defense available to the government that limits the availability of remedies on
collateral review. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
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6. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S, 719, 732 (1966) (declining to
apply retroactively the holdings of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 63940 (1965) (declining to apply retroactively the holding of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961)). Criminal non-retroactivity doctrine has been moribund on direct
review since the Court decided Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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pursuant to groundbreaking decisions that have expanded
criminal constitutional rights.10
Or think of those civil rights plaintiffs whose claims of
constitutional infringement have succumbed to a qualified
immunity defense because the law in question was not
“clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct. 11
Or of those criminal defendants denied suppression pursuant
to one of many good-faith exceptions to the exclusionary
rule.12 Or of the many parties victimized by constitutional
trial errors but denied redress on appeal or collateral review
under harmless-error doctrines.13 In fact, in rare
circumstances, the Court has even blessed what might fairly
be characterized as a withholding of remedies for ongoing
constitutional violations of the type alleged in Brown v.
Plata. Think here of cases applying statutory preclusion14 or
the various abstention doctrines15 to redirect claimants to
alternative forums from which to seek relief.
To understand why the Justices correctly assumed that
relief was mandatory once the plaintiffs in Brown v. Plata
had proved their claim—and the assumption was correct—
we must have theories of (1) when and (2) how courts may
withhold remedies for justiciable, properly raised, and

11. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (elaborating and
refining the qualified immunity defense).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 926 (1984) (requiring
the admission of evidence obtained by police officers who reasonably rely on a
faulty search warrant).
13. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).

15. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971).
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14. See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2130-31, 2140
(2012) (holding that a federal employee must assert a claim for ongoing injury
under the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee within a specified
statutory scheme and not as a freestanding constitutional claim); Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984) (similar, with respect to handicapped
children asserting claims for ongoing injury under the Equal Protection Clause).
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10. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-14 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (codifying a relitigation bar that is similar to, but distinct
from, the Teague rule).
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meritorious claims of constitutional right.16 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has not spoken with clarity on either of
these important questions. This lack of rationalization has
left the Court’s doctrines for withholding constitutional
remedies open to charges of incoherence from prominent and
influential critics. The editors of the great Hart and Wechsler
federal courts casebook imply, for example, that the Court
has improperly discriminated in favor of property rights by
mandating just compensation for takings17 and remedies for
the imposition of unconstitutional taxes,18 while
simultaneously developing remedy-limiting doctrines such as
qualified immunity that operate to withhold relief for
invasions of liberty interests.19 Similarly, and for similar
reasons, they suggest that, in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v.
Hyde, the Court arbitrarily denied a civil tort plaintiff the
benefit of an unconstitutionally generous statute of
limitations on which the plaintiff reasonably had relied
before the Court struck it down on dormant commerce clause
grounds.20 Why, they ask, did the Court view it as
impermissible to withhold from a defendant the benefit of a

17. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987).
18. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994).

20. See 514 U.S. 749, 753 (1995); FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra
note 19, at 722-23.
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19. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 741 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter FALLON ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER] (questioning the coherence of these rulings); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1827-28 (1991) [hereinafter
Fallon & Meltzer, New Law] (making the argument explicitly).
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16. Of course, one may defend the outcome in Brown v. Plata on the ground
that the obligation to provide a remedy for proven constitutional violations is
always binding. Many commentators have expressed some variation of this view.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New
Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
665 (1987). While that is not how I see things, I do not in this Article engage this
normative claim. Rather, I simply take as a given the legitimacy of what has
become a common practice—courts withholding constitutional remedies—and
seek to rationalize the practice within the context of what courts actually do.
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21. See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 722-23.
22. See John M. Greabe, Constitutional Remedies and Public Interest
Balancing, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857 (2013) [hereinafter Greabe,
Constitutional Remedies].
24. See id.; see also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
25. See Greabe, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 22, at 892-96.
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23. See id. at 863-92.
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constitutional right that was not clearly established at the
time the parties acted, given that courts regularly withhold
from civil rights plaintiffs the benefits of constitutional law
that was not clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct?21
In a previous paper, I sought to answer the “when”
question (when do courts withhold relief for constitutional
violations?) through a descriptive analysis that took as its
point of entry a functional account of constitutional remedies,
and not the historical legal/equitable paradigm that courts
and commentators ordinarily use.22 I demonstrated that the
Supreme Court has limited its development of doctrines that
withhold constitutional relief to claims for the subconstitutional remedies that function as substitutes—i.e.,
damages, suppression, and the vacatur of judgments—for the
life, liberty, or property interests irretrievably lost as the
result of wholly concluded constitutional wrongs.23 But when
faced with justiciable, properly raised, and meritorious
claims for specific remedies to ameliorate ongoing
constitutional harms rooted in government custom or policy
(as was the case in Brown v. Plata), the Court has behaved
quite differently. It has regarded some form of relief as
obligatory unless the case is a rare one calling for redirection
of the claimant to an alternative forum.24 I also preliminarily
hypothesized that the Court’s differential treatment of
claims for substitutionary and specific remedies was
appropriate in view of separation-of-powers concerns.25
In this Article, I address the “how” question (how should
courts withhold constitutional remedies?) and develop my
defense of the Supreme Court’s approach to withholding
constitutional remedies. I do so by responding to calls for a
revival of a strand of the Warren Court’s non-retroactivity
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26. See Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, supra note 19, at 1733-38; Toby J.
Heytens, The Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 596-97
(2012) [hereinafter Heytens, Framework(s)]; Toby J. Heytens, Managing
Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 972 (2006)
[hereinafter Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments].
27. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 621-25; Heytens, Managing
Transitional Moments, supra note 26, at 972-93. In so arguing, Professor Heytens
joins distinguished company. See Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, supra note 19, at
1811-12.
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28. Indeed, I have previously written in support of this precise argument. See
John M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999)
[hereinafter Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!] (arguing that courts should be careful to
avoid too frequently bypassing the merits of the pleaded constitutional claim and
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jurisprudence known as selective prospectivity, and to the
charges of current doctrinal incoherence that serve as a
backdrop to these calls.26 I reject non-retroactivity and defend
the Court’s de facto, but untheorized, adoption of a purely
remedy-limiting method for sometimes withholding relief for
properly raised and meritorious assertions of constitutional
rights. A purely remedy-limiting framework better
rationalizes recent developments in constitutional
lawmaking, allows for a contextual balancing of remedial
interests in all cases where such balancing is appropriate,
precludes such a balancing in all cases where it is
inappropriate, and furthers separation-of-powers and
federalism interests. A purely remedy-limiting framework
thus provides concrete guidance on when courts may
withhold relief from parties who have established
constitutional injury, and when they may not. Crucially, it
also accords respect to Article III limits on the judicial
power—limits that non-retroactivity doctrines exceed.
I present my argument by considering how the Supreme
Court should withhold constitutional remedies to manage the
costs of constitutional innovation. I argue within this context
for two reasons. First, the importance of managing the costs
of constitutional innovation serves as the principal premise
underlying Professor Toby Heytens’ recent calls for a revival
of non-retroactivity doctrine.27 Second, I wholeheartedly
agree with Professor Heytens’ premise; the Court certainly
should not generate and apply remedy-withholding doctrines
in a manner that stifles constitutional development.28 But as
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thereby “freezing” constitutional law in civil rights cases involving meritorious
assertions of the qualified immunity defense).
30. See Greabe, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 22.
31. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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29. See Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, supra note 19, at 1788-89.
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I shall explain, a purely remedy-limiting framework
adequately permits courts to manage the costs of
constitutional change.
That said, my proposal does not merely seek to justify the
episodic withholding of remedies to facilitate the continued
development of constitutional law. Rather, it constitutes a
general theory of when and how courts may withhold
constitutional remedies—one that the Court has been
effectively practicing since interring its non-retroactivity
jurisprudence and should now formally recognize. It thus
seeks to operationalize Professors Fallon and Meltzer’s
influential and convincing (although general) theory of
constitutionally necessary remedies: that there should be a
strong but not always unyielding presumption in favor of
individually effective relief for every constitutional violation,
and that there must exist a sufficient scheme of available
remedies to ensure that constitutional rights do not become
nullities.29
My argument proceeds as follows. The Supreme Court
has permissibly fashioned doctrines that sometimes operate
to withhold substitutionary remedies for wholly concluded
constitutional wrongs.30 Such doctrines are both necessary
and sufficient to manage the costs of innovation, and for all
other purposes that may serve as legitimate bases for
withholding constitutional remedies. But the Constitution
forbids similar remedy-limiting lawmaking—including the
use of non-retroactivity doctrines—when courts face claims
for specific constitutional remedies to ameliorate ongoing
constitutional wrongs that are grounded in unlawful
government custom or policy.31 When such claims satisfy
judicial entrance requirements and are meritorious, they
should always yield, at the very least, a judgment that
declares the underlying custom or policy unconstitutional
and prospectively establishes the rights and duties of the
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parties.32 And they ordinarily should yield relief that goes
beyond mere declaration.
The Article develops and defends this argument in three
parts. Part I tells what on the surface appears to be a story
of doctrinal chaos: over the past half-century, the Supreme
Court has, without trans-substantive rationalization,
variously employed non-retroactivity, forfeiture, and
remedy-limiting doctrines to withhold constitutional
remedies and thereby to manage the costs of constitutional
change. Part II retells the messy story told in Part I as a
comparatively coherent account of how, during the same time
period, the Court has developed doctrines that operate to
withhold substitutionary constitutional remedies for wholly
concluded constitutional wrongs, but not specific remedies
directed at ongoing constitutional violations. Part III argues
that, although the individual doctrines that operationalize
the Court’s withholding of substitutionary constitutional
remedies are in need of reform, a purely remedy-limiting
framework is superior to non-retroactivity as a means for
withholding constitutional remedies. Part III also defends
the Court against the charges of incoherence that have been
directed at its development and deployment of doctrines that
withhold constitutional remedies, and that ground calls for a
revival of non-retroactive constitutional rulings.

When a court contemplates overruling a constitutional
precedent or issuing a path-breaking constitutional decision,
it also must consider how the ruling should affect similar
cases commenced, or similar actions taken, prior to the
decision’s announcement. Constitutional innovation can be
disruptive and costly. When the change expands
constitutional protections—the messier scenario—it may call
into question the fairness of pending and completed judicial

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 55 Side B

I. MANAGING THE COSTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION:
A CHAOTIC STORY OF NON-RETROACTIVITY, FORFEITURE,
AND REMEDY-LIMITING DOCTRINES
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32. See id.
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proceedings,33 invalidate entrenched regulatory systems,34 or
condemn as unlawful government conduct for which
compensation is authorized.35 But even when the change
contracts constitutional protections and makes way for more
regulation, it may unsettle reliance interests.36 Certainly,
constitutional innovation would be more infrequent if judges
lacked doctrinal tools to manage its costs.37
The decades since Earl Warren’s chief justiceship have
seen much in the way of constitutional innovation. Not
coincidentally, and despite Marbury’s famous dictum that

33. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding
inadmissible evidence obtained from an interrogation inconsistent with specified
procedures designed to protect the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination and the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 653-56 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and
holding that state courts must exclude evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 248-49 (2005) (holding that
the mandatory nature of the United States Sentencing Guidelines violates the
Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial right); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to make nearly all
factual findings that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum).

36. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 878-79 (1992) (narrowing the scope of the right to terminate a pregnancy
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause but citing
institutional and reliance interests in support of continuing to recognize the core
of the right).
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37. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110
YALE L.J. 259, 271-75 (2000) (explaining that there would be less constitutional
reform without doctrines limiting the costs of such reform); John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90-91 (1999)
[hereinafter Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap] (observing that immunity doctrines in
constitutional tort cases reduce the costs of constitutional innovation).
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35. See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817-18 (1989)
(holding that a state violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity when it taxes retirement benefits paid by the federal government but
exempts retirement benefits paid by the state or its political subdivisions); Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53 (1980) (holding that a city’s failure
to grant a former employee a hearing to clear his name violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and exposed the city to monetary liability).
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rights-violations require remedies,38 they also have seen
significant experimentation in the creation and refinement of
doctrines that operate to withhold relief from parties with
well-founded and properly preserved constitutional claims.
In a pair of excellent recent articles, Professor Toby Heytens
has classified these doctrines into three overarching
categories—”non-retroactivity,” “forfeiture,” and “remedylimiting;”39 showed that the Court has not adequately
rationalized them; and joined Professors Richard Fallon and
Daniel Meltzer in arguing for a revival of non-retroactivity
doctrine to deal with the costs of disruptive change worked
on direct review of criminal convictions.40
In Part III, I respond to the calls for a reinvigoration of
non-retroactivity jurisprudence that Professors Heytens,
Fallon, and Meltzer have advanced. But before doing so, I
contextualize the argument by sketching the chaotic
doctrinal backdrop from which it has emerged. For Professor
Heytens is entirely correct: the Supreme Court has variously
invoked non-retroactivity, forfeiture, and remedy-limiting
doctrines to manage the costs of constitutional change
without linking them or seeking to rationalize them in light
of their common purposes.41 Consequently, Part I unfolds as
a story of messy and incomplete doctrinal development.
A. Non-Retroactivity

38. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress.”).
39. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 603-10.
40. See id. at 625; Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 26,
at 993-94; see also Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, supra note 19, at 1811-12 (arguing
that the Supreme Court should use selective prospectivity as a technique for
withholding constitutional remedies).

C M
Y K

10/09/2014 13:23:35

41. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 605-10. Professor Heytens
focuses on constitutional change worked on direct review of criminal convictions.
But his taxonomy quite helpfully organizes the Supreme Court’s approach to
managing the costs of constitutional change in all contexts—criminal and civil,
and direct and collateral review.
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Constitutional innovation within the American system
principally occurs through path-breaking judicial rulings. As
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42. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a
thousand years.”).
43. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
44. Id. at 109-10.
45. Id.

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 57 Side A

previously explained, such rulings may be disruptive and
costly. But prior to the 1960s, the Supreme Court never
claimed a power to manage the costs of constitutional change
by issuing a non-retroactive ruling—i.e., a ruling that would
not apply to similar cases commenced, or similar actions
taken, prior to its announcement. Indeed, for most of its
history, the Court has taken the retroactive application of
judicial rulings as a given.42
An early Supreme Court case, United States v. Schooner
Peggy, shows the assumption of retroactive law-application
in action.43 The case interpreted a treaty provision that
required the United States to return French vessels that had
been captured but not “definitively” condemned as of the
treaty date.44 The question was whether the provision should
apply to a French vessel that had been captured and
condemned by a lower court judgment that was on appeal to
the Supreme Court when the treaty became effective.45 The
Court held the provision operative and ordered that the ship
be returned.46 In the process, the Court rejected the argument
that it should apply the law in effect at the time of the lower
court judgment because an appellate court’s role is to set
aside only “erroneous” decisions.47 (All agreed that the lower
court decision was not “erroneous” when entered). The Court
responded that it was under an obligation to enforce the
provision and reverse the judgment because a court’s role is
to apply all binding law that is in effect when the court
rules—as the treaty provision was when the Court addressed
its applicability.48

46. Id. at 108.
48. See id. at 110. If the treaty had specified that it should have only
prospective effect, then the Court presumably would have so applied it. See
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47. Id. at 108-10.
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This answer reflected the then-prevalent understanding
that judging does not involve lawmaking; it involves mere
declaration of what the law is. To be sure, the Court struggled
at times to abide strictly by this conception. For example, in
a series of late-nineteenth and early twentieth century cases
dealing with breaches of various contractual obligations, the
Court declined to follow recent, law-changing state supreme
court decisions making relief unavailable to the plaintiffs on
state law grounds—federal courts usually followed such
decisions even during the era of Swift v. Tyson49—and instead
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to invoke the law in
effect at the time of the underlying transaction in federal
court.50 But in doing so, the Court did not say that it was
declining to apply “decision-time” law or treating the
intervening decisions as prospective rulings inapplicable to
prior transactions.51 Rather, the Court invoked the Swift
fiction, explained that it was applying what it saw as the
governing law,52 and carved out exceptions from its ordinary
practice of deferring to state decisional law on state law
questions where the state’s decisional law was not “settled”
in favor of the defendants at the time the Court addressed
the issue.53
Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of
Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1083 (1999).

50. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 369-70 (1910); Burgess
v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1883); Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175,
205-06 (1863).
51. See Roosevelt, supra note 48, at 1080 (differentiating between the
“decision-time result” and the “transaction-time result” in describing nonretroactivity jurisprudence). Professor Roosevelt’s superb article provides a
detailed account of these municipal bond default cases, see id. at 1084-87, and,
more generally, the trajectory of non-retroactivity jurisprudence in American law.
See generally id. at 1080-103.

53. See Burgess, 107 U.S. at 32-34; see also Roosevelt, supra note 48, at 108687.
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52. See Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 540-41 (1941)
(describing Burgess and Kuhn as relying on federal independence and not nonretroactivity); Gelpcke, 68 U.S. at 206-07 (reasserting federal independence from
state decisional law).
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49. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (holding that the common law decisions of
state tribunals are only evidence of what the law is and not law themselves).
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In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court moved
beyond Blackstonian notions of law and the judicial function
and acknowledged that judging involves law creation.54 This
acknowledgment opened the door to the possibility of rulings
that would apply “transaction-time” law, instead of “decisiontime” law, in situations where application of transaction-time
law seemed more equitable or practical.55 In 1932, the
Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of the
practice when undertaken by state courts.56 But throughout
the 1940s and 1950s, the Court itself continued to follow the
approach of Schooner Peggy and apply decision-time law
when confronted with the question whether it should apply
law-changing legislation57 or judicial decisions58 to cases
commenced, or events occurring, under earlier legal regimes.
Indeed, in 1940, the Court went so far as to repudiate earlier
decisions to the contrary59 and to hold that federal courts
“should conform their orders to the state law as of the time of
the entry. Intervening and conflicting decisions will thus
cause the reversal of judgments which were correct when
entered.”60
As Professor Kermit Roosevelt has put it, while “[t]here
were flickers of [federal non-retroactivity following Erie’s
repudiation of Swift], . . . it was not until the late 1960s that

55. See Roosevelt, supra note 48, at 1078.
56. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 366 (1932). But
see James B. Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court Retroactivity
Analysis: An Inadequate Surrogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1062, 1065-66 (1984) (arguing that Sunburst
should be read to authorize only prospective, law-changing state court rulings on
statutory and common law issues, but not constitutional issues).
57. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U.S. 23, 29 (1940).
58. See, e.g., Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 541-43
(1940).
59. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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60. Vandenbark, 311 U.S. at 543. The repudiation here was not of prospective
rulings; it was of Burgess and Kuhn’s use of the Swift fiction to treat the
intervening, law-changing decision as prospective. See supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
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Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and its conception of law as a “brooding
omnipresence”).
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these sparks found tinder. It was then that the Court found
a need to engage in prospective overruling; [and] . . . the
question of retroactivity truly emerged.”61 By the late 1960s,
the Warren Court’s overhauling of the law of constitutional
criminal procedure was well underway. In 1961, in Mapp v.
Ohio,62 the Supreme Court had overruled its earlier decision
in Wolf v. Colorado63 to hold that state courts must exclude
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 64 In
1965, in Linkletter v. Walker,65 the Court considered whether
Mapp should lead it to set aside on collateral review a preMapp state court decision involving a pre-Mapp search.66 The
Court declined to vacate the judgment. Instead, it applied a
three-factor test that looked to the purpose of the new Mapp
rule, reliance interests, and the practical effects of retroactive
law application.67 The Court held that Mapp should not
operate retroactively on cases “where the judgment of
conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal
exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari had
elapsed before . . . Mapp.”68
Linkletter provoked a firestorm of commentary and
criticism69—especially with respect to its unexplained

62. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
63. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
64. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
65. 381 U.S. 618, 621-22 (1965).
66. See id. at 619-20.
67. See id. at 637-38.
68. Id. at 622 n.5.
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69. See, e.g., Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique
and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1565-66 (1975); Thomas S. Currier, Time and
Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 201-04
(1965); James B. Haddad, “Retroactivity Should be Rethought”: A Call for the End
of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 417 (1969); Paul Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law,
79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due
Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 763 (1966).
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(1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 275
(1951) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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distinction between cases on direct and collateral review70—
but non-retroactivity analysis quickly became the Warren
Court’s principal method for managing the costs of its rightsexpanding changes to the law of constitutional criminal
procedure.71 In Stovall v. Denno, the Court reformed its
approach to hold that rulings establishing new rights must
apply to the parties in the cases in which they are
announced.72 But their application to all other cases—
whether arising on direct or collateral review—were to be
judged by Linkletter’s purpose-reliance-effect test.73 The
result was a rule of “selective prospectivity” that integrated
the treatment of cases on direct and collateral review but
discriminated between otherwise identically situated
defendants on a seemingly more arbitrary ground: whether
the defendant happened to be the party in whose case the
new rule was announced.74
The Stenno selective prospectivity regime did not sit well
with Justice Harlan, who in a series of concurrences and
dissents75 developed an entirely different approach. Starting
from the premise that courts always should decide cases
according to their best understanding of the law, Justice

71. Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 605 (explaining how the Warren
Court used non-retroactivity doctrine to manage the costs of its law-changing
rulings in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)).
72. 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
73. Id. at 296-301. This reform ameliorated the perceived unfairness in
applying Mapp to searches challenged on direct review but not to later-occurring
searches challenged on collateral review. See supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
74. See Roosevelt, supra note 48, at 1092-93.
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75. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 675 (1971) (Harlan,
dissenting); Elkanich v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 675 (1971) (Harlan,
concurring); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-81 (1971) (Harlan,
concurring); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1969) (Harlan,
dissenting).

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 59 Side A

70. See Roosevelt, supra note 48, at 1090 (noting that the unexplained
distinction between direct and collateral review drawn in Linkletter led to a denial
of Linkletter’s habeas petition even though the unlawful search he endured
occurred after the search in Mapp, whose fruits were suppressed).
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76. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Simply fishing one case
from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases
subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible
departure from th[e] model of judicial review [requiring courts to decide cases
according to their best understanding of the law].”).
77. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 260-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. See 479 U.S. 314, 320-28 (1987).
80. Id. at 322.
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Harlan thought it clear that path-breaking constitutional
rulings must apply to all cases on direct review.76 But he also
thought it permissible for the Court to differentiate between
cases arriving on direct and collateral review because the
principal purpose of collateral review—deterring trial and
appellate courts from ignoring established constitutional
standards—was not ordinarily served by the application of
decision-time law.77 In Justice Harlan’s view, only pathbreaking constitutional rulings that held previously
punishable conduct to be constitutionally protected, or that
recognized a new right of procedure that is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, should give rise to relief on
collateral review; otherwise, the interest in the finality of
state-court judgments should prevail.78
Over time, the Supreme Court came to accept Justice
Harlan’s positions. In 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court
held that all new rules of constitutional criminal procedure
must apply retroactively on direct review.79 The ruling rested
on two “basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”80 First,
“the nature of judicial review” strips the Court of the
quintessentially “legislative” prerogative of making rules
prospective only.81 Second, the “selective application of new
rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated
[parties] the same.82 In 1989, in Teague v. Lane, the Court
effectively accepted Justice Harlan’s formulation with
respect to collateral review as well.83 Thus, since the late

81. Id.
83. See 489 U.S. 288, 305-13 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(reformulating Justice Harlan’s second exception into one holding that a court on
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82. Id. at 323.
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1980s, non-retroactivity doctrine has played no role on direct
review of criminal convictions. But the Court continues its
unhelpful84 use of the rhetoric of “non-retroactivity” and
“prospectivity” to describe the limited availability of relief on
collateral review under law-changing, rights-expanding
decisions.85
Non-retroactivity doctrine experienced a somewhat
similar rise and fall in the context of civil litigation. In 1971,
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, the Supreme Court adopted a
tripartite non-retroactivity test similar to the Linkletter
framework and used it to relieve the plaintiff from the effect
of an intervening Court decision that otherwise would have
rendered his claim—which was timely under circuit
precedent on the date it was filed—outside of the applicable
statute of limitations.86 The Court applied the Chevron Oil
rule throughout the 1970s and 1980s.87 And, as late as 1990,
in American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, a Court plurality
invoked the rule to limit a state’s liability for an
unconstitutional tax to the period following the date on which
the Court issued a decision (in a different case) making
apparent the tax’s unconstitutionality.88 But, in 1993, in
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, a Court majority

84. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
85. In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, which imposed a re-litigation bar that is similar to but distinct from the
Teague rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (codifying re-litigation bar); see also
Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam) (observing that the statutory
and Teague inquiries are distinct).
86. See 404 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1971), abrogated by Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
87. See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
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88. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 178-83 (O’Connor, J.,
plurality opinion). Justice Scalia supplied the fifth vote for the case’s nonretroactive result because he did not believe the tax in question to be
unconstitutional. See id. at 202-04 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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collateral review may apply a new rule that implicates the fundamental fairness
of the trial and is necessary to prevent a serious diminishment of the likelihood
of an accurate conviction). Since Teague, Supreme Court majorities have
repeatedly endorsed Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion and thereby made its
proposed standard binding law. See FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER, supra note
19, at 1242.
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repudiated Chevron Oil’s non-retroactivity principle in the
civil context under reasoning that closely tracked the
analysis employed in Griffith.89 And, in 1995, in Reynoldsville
Casket Co. v. Hyde, the Court unambiguously reiterated that
Harper had abrogated Chevron Oil.90
B.

Forfeiture

As Professor Heytens has observed, rights-expanding
criminal constitutional rulings did not end with the Warren
Court.91 Yet the demise of non-retroactivity doctrine forced
the Supreme Court to find other ways to manage the costs of
constitutional innovation. In the context of direct review of
criminal convictions, one vehicle that the modern Court has
put to energetic use has been the “forfeiture” principle
grounded in the “plain-error” doctrine. The plain-error
doctrine finds its roots in the Court’s 1896 decision in Wiborg
v. United States.92 In that case, the Court reversed the
convictions of two criminal defendants for evidentiary
insufficiency even though the defendants had not raised
sufficiency challenges at trial. The Court asserted a power to
notice a “plain error” in such circumstances because the
“matter [was] so absolutely vital to defendants.”93

90. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995).
91. See Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 26, at 931-40.
Professor Heytens discusses United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506 (1995). Gaudin held that the Constitution requires the jury to determine
materiality in prosecutions for perjury and false statements. Apprendi held the
Constitution requires the indictment to charge all facts and the jury to make
nearly all factual findings that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the
statutory maximum. Crawford held that the Constitution bars the use of out-ofcourt testimonial statements used for their truth value against the defendant.
Blakely and Booker held that the Apprendi rule invalidates state and federal
guidelines sentencing schemes insofar as they mandate certain sentencing
outcomes on the basis of required judicial fact-finding.
93. Id. at 658-59. Professor Heytens’ article on managing transitional moments
provides a more detailed account of the development of the criminal plain-error
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92. See Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 659 (1896).
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The authority to vacate criminal judgments on the basis
of a plain error to which no objection was raised is now
expressed in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).94 The
Rule confers on the federal courts an entirely discretionary
power: “A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court’s
attention.”95 In 1993, in United States v. Olano, the Supreme
Court explained how courts should decide whether to notice
a Rule 52(b) error.96 First, there must have been an error,
which is defined as “[d]eviation from a legal rule.”97 Second,
the error must have been “plain,” meaning “clear” or
“obvious.”98 Third, the error must have “affected substantial
rights,” meaning “prejudicial.”99 Finally, the error must have
“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.”100
The Olano Court reserved the question of how plain-error
review should be conducted in a context where the governing
law changed after entry of the lower court’s judgment, but
the defendant had failed to object and preserve the issue for
appellate review.101 Four years later, in Johnson v. United
States,102 the Court took up this problem. The question in
Johnson was whether the Eleventh Circuit had erred in
declining to exercise its Rule 52(b) authority to notice Gaudin
error—failure to submit the issue of materiality to the

94. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). In 2003, a court’s authority to notice plain error
was also expressly recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
relevant provision, FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2), authorizes courts to notice plain error
in civil jury instructions “if the error affects substantial rights.” The provision was
written to conform to FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d) advisory
committee’s note.
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
96. See 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993).
97. Id. at 732-33.
98. Id. at 734 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1985)).
99. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
101. See id. at 734.
102. 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
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100. Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
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103. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995).
104. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 464.
105. Id. at 463.
106. Id. at 468. Last Term, in Henderson v. United States, the Court extended
this rule so that it now also covers situations in which the law was unsettled at
the time of trial. See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1125-31 (2013).
107. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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108. Id. at 470.
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jury103—in a federal perjury prosecution tried before Gaudin
was decided.104 The Court unanimously held that the
Eleventh Circuit had not erred.105 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court agreed with the defendant that there had been a
“plain” error: “In a case . . . where the law at the time of trial
was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal—it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of
appellate consideration.”106 But even on the assumption that
the error had affected Johnson’s “substantial rights” and
thus caused her prejudice, it had not “seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”107 The reason? The evidence against the
defendant had been overwhelming, and the materiality issue
had been essentially uncontested at trial and on appeal.108
The Supreme Court has used a similar approach to
manage the fallout from two other recent decisions that
worked massive changes in constitutional criminal
procedure. In 2002, in United States v. Cotton, the Court
reversed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to notice Apprendi
error—failure of the indictment to charge and the jury to find
facts that increased the defendants’ sentences beyond the
statutory maximum109—to which no objection was lodged
during the trial of a large federal criminal drug conspiracy
that concluded before Apprendi was decided.110 The Court
disagreed with the lower court’s determination that the error
had affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings because, again, the evidence supporting
the
findings
was
overwhelming
and
essentially

109. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
110. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629 (2002).
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uncontested.111 And, in 2005, in United States v. Booker—
which held unconstitutional the statute that had made the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandatory112—the Court
effectively admonished lower courts to follow the example set
in Cotton and to “apply ordinary prudential doctrines,
determining, for example, whether the issue was raised
below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”113
C. Remedy-Limiting Doctrines (Part I)

111. Id. at 633.
112. See supra text accompanying note 91.
113. See 535 U.S. 220, 268 (2005).
114. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
115. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 607-08.
117. See 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
118. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
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116. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424.
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Professor Heytens uses the Supreme Court’s 2011
decision in Davis v. United States114 to exemplify the third
method within his taxonomy of approaches that the Supreme
Court has used to manage the costs of constitutional
change—those cases in which the Court has developed
doctrines to limit remedies in the wake of a path-breaking
constitutional ruling.115 Until 2009, lower courts had widely
held that police officers are entitled to search the entire
passenger compartment of a vehicle whose driver has been
lawfully arrested.116 But in Arizona v. Gant, the Court held
that such searches are permissible only in circumstances
where the arrestee is within reach of the compartment at the
time of the search or where there is a reasonably held belief
that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense that spurred
the arrest.117
The question in Davis was whether to require the
suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a pre-Gant
search in a case pending on direct review at the time Gant
was decided.118 Forfeiture was not an available ground for
denying relief because the defendant’s attorney had
anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gant and, on that
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basis, moved to suppress the evidence seized from the
defendant’s car.119 But the Court still refused to set aside the
judgment of conviction. Relying on three lines of precedent
holding that there is no constitutional right to the exclusion
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,120
that the sole purpose of exclusion is deterrence,121 and that
the exclusion remedy should be ordered only when a court
believes that its deterrence benefits outweigh its costs,122 the
Court concluded that exclusion is unwarranted in
circumstances where a search is conducted in objectively
reasonable reliance on a binding judicial precedent.123 The
Court’s decision in Davis thus joins lines of authority from
across remedial contexts authorizing courts to withhold
remedies for violations of constitutional rights.124 I shall have
more to say about these lines of authority—which, in addition
to criminal procedure cases, also arise from cases sounding
in constitutional tort, appellate procedure, and the
procedures governing collateral review—in Part II.
II. THE STORY RETOLD: A FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

119. Id. at 2426.
120. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
121. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 & n.2 (2009).
122. See id. at 141.

10/09/2014 13:23:35

123. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-28.
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Part I tells the story of a Supreme Court engaged in
inconsistent and badly theorized experimentation as it seeks
to identify a principled approach to managing the costs of
constitutional innovation that is consistent with Article III
and the presumption that rights-violations ordinarily require
remedies.125 Part II looks at the Court’s behavior from a
different perspective. Employing a functional account of
constitutional remedies instead of the usual law/equity
paradigm, Part II canvasses the circumstances in which the
Court has created remedy-limiting doctrines to advance the

124. See infra Part II.
125. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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A. Why a Functional Account?
Lawyers usually classify remedies in historical terms—
as either “legal” or “equitable.” Unfortunately, speaking of
remedies in law/equity terms often obscures the realities of
modern practice. For example, the conventional account of
our remedial tradition holds that courts may exercise their
equitable powers to withhold remedies that undermine the
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126. In Part II, I distill the comprehensive account of the Supreme Court’s
approach to public interest balancing that I provided in a recent paper. See
Greabe, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 22, at 863-92. Readers interested in
greater detail should consult this earlier work.
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perceived public interest—a practice that I call “public
interest balancing.”126
This overview will demonstrate that the Court has
limited itself to withholding remedies through public interest
balancing only when the claimant seeks a substitute for a
constitutionally protected interest irretrievably lost as a
result of a wholly concluded violation. By contrast, when the
claimant seeks a specific remedy to ameliorate an ongoing
constitutional harm rooted in government custom or policy
(which pretty much describes the entire universe of
situations in which specific relief is available), the Court has
regarded some form of relief as obligatory, even though it has
sometimes redirected the claimant to an alternative forum
with instructions to seek relief there.
To be sure, the Court has never sought to explain or
justify its change-management techniques through such a
functional account of constitutional remedies. But it should.
The Court’s actual creation of doctrines that withhold
remedies—to reduce the costs of constitutional innovation or
for any other purpose—fits snugly within this retold story.
Moreover, as Part III shows, the Court’s behavior has been
both respectful of constitutional boundaries and suggestive
of a workable framework for the creation and modification of
remedy-limiting doctrines in those circumstances—but only
those circumstances—where courts may appropriately apply
such a doctrine. The Court should rationalize and provide a
trans-substantive defense of what it has in fact been doing.
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public interest.127 And a court’s equitable powers are most
commonly associated with the issuance of specific
remedies.128 Yet the practice of public interest balancing
should not be associated with the Court’s issuance of specific
constitutional remedies. For the Court’s practice has been
routinely to award relief responsive to ongoing unlawful
government custom or policy—and not to engage in public
interest balancing—when specific relief is available to
redress meritorious claims of constitutional right brought at
a proper time and in a proper forum.129 Indeed, the modern
Court has used public interest balancing exclusively in the
context of developing remedy-limiting doctrines applicable to
claims for substitutionary relief—a form of relief most
commonly associated with a court’s legal powers.130 As a
consequence, the conventional account of our remedial
tradition has things backwards when it comes to
constitutional remedies.131

127. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816 (2010); Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 373-75 (2008); Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 327-30
(1944); Greathouse v. Dern (ex rel. Dern), 289 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1933).
128. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 6 (4th ed. 2010) (noting
that “most equitable remedies are specific”).
129. See infra Part II.B.

131. Professor Laycock has provided a succinct explanation of why the
law/equity distinction confuses more than it clarifies:

10/09/2014 13:23:35

The line between law and equity is largely the result of a bureaucratic
fight for turf; each set of courts [i.e., the separate law and equity courts
that existed both in England and throughout the United States prior to
last century’s merger of law and equity] took as much jurisdiction as it
could get. Consequently, the line is jagged and not especially functional;
it can only be memorized. Damages are the most important legal remedy;
in general, compensatory and punitive damages are legal. Injunctions
and specific performance decrees are the most important equitable
remedies; some of the specialized coercive remedies, such as mandamus,
prohibition, and habeas corpus, are legal. Declaratory judgments were
created by statute after the merger, so they are not classified either way;
most of the older, more specialized declaratory remedies are equitable.
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130. See infra Part II.B; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 128, at 6 (noting that
“[m]ost legal remedies are substitutionary” but also observing that “there
are . . . exceptions in both directions” that make the law/equity distinction an
inadequate proxy for the substitutionary/specific distinction).
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In the context of constitutional litigation, it is far less
confusing to use functional terms, rather than law/equity
labels, to analyze the Supreme Court’s creation and use of
remedy-limiting doctrines to protect the public interest.
Functionally speaking, “[t]he most fundamental remedial
choice is between substitutionary and specific remedies.” 132
And in the context of constitutional remedies, the difference
between the two is as follows. Specific constitutional
remedies “permit a right-holder to halt an ongoing, or avoid
an imminent, unconstitutional deprivation of life, liberty, or
property; in other words, they provide or restore to the rightholder the very freedom, interest, or thing that the
Constitution promises.”133 Substitutionary constitutional
Restitution was developed independently in both sets of courts; some
restitutionary remedies are legal, some equitable, and some both.
LAYCOCK, supra note 128, at 6.
132. Id. at 5 (quoting DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY
RULE 12-13 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991)).

10/09/2014 13:23:35
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133. Greabe, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 22, at 866. I constructed this
definition on the foundation provided by Professor Colleen Murphy’s
instrumental definition of the general difference between specific and
substitutionary remedies: “[S]pecific remedies provide the original thing or
condition to which the [claimant] was entitled, while substitutionary remedies
provide something else.” Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a “Specific” Remedy, 58
ALA. L. REV. 119, 126 (2006); see also JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES § 2.2, at 4 (2d ed. 2006) (“A substitutional remedy is something other
than a specific remedy.”). Of course, there are situations in which a claimant
securing a judgment ordering a specific remedy will still suffer the lingering
effects of the unconstitutional custom or policy at which the remedy is directed.
The Court’s desegregation cases, starting with Brown v. Board of Education, and
its famous remedial directive that the school defendants need only desegregate
“with all deliberate speed,” provide examples of cases where plaintiffs were able
to secure a declaration of unconstitutionality, but little else in terms of on-theground change. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“Brown II”). Brown v. Plata provides
another example with respect to those convicts whose sentences expired before
any actual relief from overcrowding was achieved. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct.
1910 (2011); supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. Yet these cases differ
materially and significantly from those cases where courts deny substitutionary
remedies altogether under doctrines such as qualified immunity, exceptions to
the exclusionary rule, and harmless-error principles. For cases such as Brown II
and Plata declare unconstitutional and render prospectively illegal—and subject
to enforcement through the court’s contempt power—a custom or policy that had
been affirmatively causing the claimant an ongoing Article III injury up to the
time of judgment. Some would say that this is not much, and many would say
that it is not enough. But at a minimum, such a judgment delivers to the claimant
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a statement of prospective rights and duties between the parties that can serve
as the basis for additional, future relief from the court. This is not wholly without
value.
134. Greabe, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 22, at 866 (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted); see also Murphy, supra note 133, at 137-38 & n.111
(explaining that remedies for harms that have accrued prior to the judgment date
are usually substitutionary).
136. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
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135. See infra Parts II.C and III.

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 64 Side B

remedies, on the other hand, “provide something else to
victims of constitutional violations—usually . . . because the
violation is wholly realized by the time it is raised in court
and therefore cannot be headed off, halted, or undone.”134 As
we shall see, the contrast between the Supreme Court’s
willingness to develop remedy-limiting doctrines to advance
the public interest in connection with claims for
substitutionary constitutional remedies, and its refusal to do
so in connection with claims for specific constitutional
remedies, is telling.135
An additional prefatory comment also is warranted.
Readers should not misread the account that follows as one
that ascribes constitutional significance to remedial
labeling—i.e., whether a remedy is classified as
“substitutionary” or “specific.” Of course, the labeling does
not do the constitutional work; rather, it is how the remedy
functions. Other distinctions focusing on function—for
example, one that distinguishes between whether a litigant
is attempting to deploy a constitutional right as either a
“sword” or a “shield” in service of a request for relief136—might
serve to illustrate my principal point nearly as well. I have
elected to focus on the Supreme Court’s differential
treatment of substitutionary and specific constitutional
remedies because the distinction quite helpfully illuminates
a boundary that, I suggest, is of constitutional dimension:
that between, on the one hand, the concluded constitutional
wrongs, typically worked by individuals exercising
discretionary government power, for which courts may
provide the victim only with some sub-constitutional
substitute for the irretrievably lost interest; and, on the other
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hand, ongoing constitutional wrongs, typically rooted in
government custom or policy, for which courts often have the
capacity to provide or restore to the victim that which has
been, or imminently will be, unlawfully compromised.137
B. Substitutionary Versus Specific Constitutional Remedies
The paradigmatic substitutionary remedy is a monetary
damage award. Indeed, remedies treatises often speak as
though this is the only substitutionary remedy.138 Certainly,
a judgment directing the defendant to pay money damages to
the victim of a constitutional wrong is a prototypical
substitutionary constitutional remedy. Such judgments
almost always run against individual defendants who have
misused government power—under the causes of action
authorized against federal defendants by Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics139
and state defendants by 42 U.S.C. § 1983140—because
sovereign immunity shields the federal government from
damages claims141 and the states themselves are not
“person[s]” subject to suit under Section 1983.142
137. See infra Part III; see also supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 133, § 2.2, at 4; ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL.,
EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 1 (7th ed. 2005)
(“Substitutionary relief substitutes money for the specific relief.”).
140. In relevant part, the statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation or any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
141. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
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142. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
Municipalities also are “person[s]” suable under Section 1983 and, in relatively
rare circumstances, have been held liable in damages for harm caused by their
unlawful customs or policies. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
700-01 (1978). Indeed, municipalities are the only government entities subject to
damages judgments for constitutional violations. But municipal “custom or
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Yet in the constitutional context, two other
substitutionary remedies also are common. The first is a
judicial order excluding at trial evidence obtained as the
result of a prior, wholly concluded constitutional violation—
e.g., violations of the Fourth Amendment and certain
violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.143 The second
is a judicial order invalidating a judgment infected by any
constitutional error other than a previous failure to nullify
an unconstitutional statute or regulation by which the
government has brought, or seeks to bring, an enforcement
action.144 With respect to exclusion, one must distinguish
between orders that provide substitutionary relief because
they “remediate” earlier, wholly concluded constitutional
violations, and those that merely vindicate constitutional
trial rights in present time and therefore are not properly
viewed as “remedies” at all.145 And with respect to the
invalidation of judgments, we must bear in mind that the

policy” liability has been defined so narrowly that it is exceptionally difficult to
establish. See, e.g., Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 37, at 93. Thus, as
noted in the text, damages awards for constitutional torts almost always run
against individuals.

144. A ruling in favor of the subject of an enforcement action that the statute
authorizing the action is unconstitutional—whether facially or as-applied and
whether rendered by a trial or a reviewing court—is perhaps the most
fundamental of specific remedies; it restores to its beneficiary the liberty or
property right that is being wrongfully deprived by the enforcement action. See
FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 718; John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 139192 (2007).
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145. I place the word “remediate” in quotation marks because the purpose of
exclusion is deterrence and not to compensate the victim for the right-violation.
See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 & n.2 (2009).
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143. See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590-92 (2009) (observing that
violations of the Fourth Amendment and certain Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights are wholly concluded prior to trial, and holding that the same is true with
respect to violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel recognized in
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); see also Arnold H. Loewy, PoliceObtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally
Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907
(1989).
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order of invalidation may come from a trial judge,146 on direct
review of the judgment,147 or on collateral review.148 But both
types of order—exclusion and vacatur—often only supply
substitutionary remedies; both often provide only “something
else” in response to a prior, wholly realized deprivation of an
interest protected by the Constitution.149
There also are a number of specific constitutional
remedies—remedies that provide or restore the very freedom,
interest, or thing that the Constitution promises to the rightholder. The most fundamental specific remedy—a ruling in
favor of the subject of an enforcement action that the statute
authorizing the action is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied (and the concomitant dismissal or enjoinment of the
enforcement action)—already has been mentioned.150 Other
146. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (new trial or alteration or amendment of a
judgment); FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (relief from judgment or order); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29
(acquittal); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (new trial).
147. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (authorizing appeals from final decisions
of federal district courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012) (authorizing appeals from some
interlocutory decisions of federal district courts).
148. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) (authorizing collateral attacks on state
court judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) (authorizing collateral attacks on
federal court judgments).
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150. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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149. Courts also have issued a fourth type of non-specific constitutional remedy:
a provision of a structural reform injunction that outruns the underlying
constitutional violation that justified judicial intervention in the first instance.
See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 128, at 311 (observing that the remedial decree
upheld in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
contained provisions that far exceeded the scope of the constitutional violation);
id. at 330 (similar, with respect to a remedial decree, upheld in Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978), that prohibited Arkansas prisons from placing inmates into
punitive isolation for more than 30 days); Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 144,
at 1387. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
structural reform injunctions should be entirely restorative. See, e.g., Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1929 (2011) (recognizing the authority of courts to enter
orders limiting prison populations when “necessary to ensure compliance with a
constitutional mandate”); id. at 1940 (observing that the Court has “rejected
remedial orders that unnecessarily reach out to improve prison conditions other
than those that violate the Constitution”); id. at 1944 (“Of course, courts must not
confuse professional standards with constitutional requirements.”). So it is at the
very least doubtful that this final type of non-specific constitutional remedy still
passes constitutional muster.
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specific constitutional remedies are provided through
injunctions, declarations, or judicial rulings that proscribe
ongoing or imminent violations of individual rights other
than unconstitutional enforcement actions;151 the provision of
access to a judicial officer through the Great Writ of habeas
corpus (so long as Congress has not lawfully suspended its
availability);152 just compensation for takings;153 and the
guarantee of an effective remedy for the coercive collection of
an unconstitutional tax, duty, or fee.154
Note the fundamental difference between those
constitutional violations that typically give rise to a
substitutionary remedy and those that typically give rise to
a specific remedy. Situations calling for the imposition of
substitutionary constitutional remedies typically involve
151. See, e.g., Plata, 131 S. Ct. (seeking specific relief responsive to allegedly
unconstitutional prison overcrowding); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988)
(seeking specific remedy of reinstatement to federal employment for claimed
unlawful discharge on the basis of unconstitutional sexual orientation
discrimination). I here emphasize “individual rights” because the Supreme Court
recently has shown a discomfort with at least some claims seeking to enforce
structural provisions of the Constitution, such as the Supremacy Clause. See
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012); Stephen I. Vladek,
Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte Young, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 13 (2012),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/douglas-and-the-fate-of-ex-parte-young.

153. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194 (1985) (noting that the Takings Clause “does not proscribe the taking of
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation”). Recently, the Supreme
Court reiterated that the obligation to provide just compensation for a taking is a
“categorical duty.” Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511,
518 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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154. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (stating that “a denial by
a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution
of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted). The specific post-deprivation remedy
protected by due process can be: (1) a refund of the unconstitutional tax, see, e.g.,
Ward v. Love Cnty., 253 U.S. 17 (1920); (2) the retroactive imposition of an
equalizing tax on similarly situated taxpayers who were unconstitutionally
favored, see, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496
U.S. 18 (1990); or (3) some combination of the two, see id. at 39-41.
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152. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Contrast this most elemental
and specific form of habeas corpus, presently available through 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(2012), with the collateral review habeas corpus mechanisms provided by 28
U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (2012), which are vehicles for providing substitutionary
relief.

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 67 Side A

2014]

10/09/2014 13:23:35

REMEDIAL DISCRETION

911

actions challenging the completed acts of persons wielding
governmental authority—executive-branch officials, judicial
officers, judicial branch employees, or private citizens
exercising government authority pursuant to the state-action
doctrine—who exercise discretion and act in dynamic
contexts.155 Such discretionary acts usually cannot be
challenged in real time or in advance of their occurrence; they
typically are over and done with by the time a court has the
opportunity to pass on their constitutionality and consider
whether and how to remedy them.156 Therefore, we may
generalize that substitutionary constitutional remedies are
usually the only means available to courts to respond to
completed government “conduct” originating with the
discretionary acts of individuals exercising government
power—and to try to influence similar conduct in the
future—that has unconstitutionally infringed (past tense)
the constitutional interests of a right-holder with standing.
Situations calling for the imposition of specific
constitutional remedies, by contrast, almost invariably
involve actions challenging something more than an exercise
of discretion by an individual government actor. Specific
constitutional remedies are typically directed at ongoing
government policies or customs (broadly defined)—statutes,
rules, regulations, informal or unwritten understandings, or
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156. Standing limitations make anticipatory and generalized challenges to such
acts by individual plaintiffs nearly impossible. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983) (denying standing to the victim of an allegedly
unconstitutional police chokehold to bring a prospective and generalized
challenge to the legality of the practice because the plaintiff had not established
a likelihood of being subjected to such a chokehold again). But cf.
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (authorizing the Attorney General to sue for equitable
and declaratory relief for a pattern or practice of misconduct by state or local law
enforcement agencies).
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155. A judgment for money damages under Section 1983 against a municipality
for harm caused by an unconstitutional custom or policy—which may well be
ongoing—is an exception to this generalization. Also, courts sometimes reverse
judgments of conviction after holding unconstitutional trial procedures that were
required by government custom or policy and were not the product of
discretionary judgments. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
(holding that the mandatory nature of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial right); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to make
nearly all factual findings that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the
statutory maximum).
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the decisions of those who function as government
policymakers—which stand behind and guide the
enforcement agent who has acted (or imminently will act)
upon the person asserting constitutional injury. Such actions
often can be brought during the pendency of the
constitutional violation; indeed, it is the ongoing nature of
the violation that makes specific relief available in fact.
Therefore, we may generalize that specific constitutional
remedies are the means by which courts declare
unconstitutional and prospectively terminate the operation
of “laws” (again, broadly defined to encompass not only
statutes, rules, regulations, etc., but also those acts that
operationalize the decisions of government agents who
function as policymakers) that are unconstitutionally
infringing (present tense) the constitutional interests of a
right-holder with standing.
C. Remedy-Limiting Doctrines (Part II)

10/09/2014 13:23:35
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When we classify constitutional remedies in terms of how
they function, we quickly see that the Supreme Court has
developed remedy-limiting doctrines designed to protect the
public interest from the costs that a more liberal allowance
of substitutionary constitutional remedies otherwise might
engender. Such doctrines frequently operate to withhold
remedies from victims of wholly realized constitutional
violations that have been properly raised and advanced by
means of a justiciable claim. But we also see that the Court
has not used public interest balancing to develop remedylimiting doctrines that withhold specific remedies from
victims of ongoing constitutional violations rooted in
governmental custom or policy. Instead, the Court has
routinely granted some form of relief in circumstances where
the relief is sought by means of a meritorious claim that
otherwise satisfies judicial entry requirements: one that is
justiciable and has been properly and timely raised in a
proper forum against a proper defendant.
Substitutionary monetary damages awards are far from
freely available. As explained above, most constitutional
claims for money damages target individuals who exercise
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government power.157 When the individuals in question
exercise federal power, any claim against them must proceed
under the Bivens doctrine.158 Since 1980, however, the Court
has severely curtailed the availability of relief pursuant to
Bivens.159 The Court also has created an “absolute immunity”
under Bivens and Section 1983 that cloaks legislators acting
in a legislative capacity,160 judges acting in a judicial
capacity,161 prosecutors acting in a prosecutorial capacity,162
grand jurors,163 and witnesses,164 and renders them free from
both liability and the burdens of trial.
Moreover, all government actors not protected by
absolute immunity are entitled to a qualified immunity from
suit and damages liability under the Bivens doctrine and
Section 1983.165 As presently formulated, the qualified
immunity doctrine protects conduct that was objectively
reasonable in light of “clearly established” law at the time the

157. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.

160. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
161. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
162. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-20 (1976).
163. Id. at 423 n.20.
164. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1510 (2012) (grand jury witnesses);
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983) (trial witnesses).
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165. The Supreme Court has suggested, although it has not yet held, that
private parties who sometimes face constitutional claims under Bivens or Section
1983 under the state-action doctrine may be entitled to assert a “good-faith”
defense that would overlap substantially, if not replicate, the qualified immunity
that protects individual government actors. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S.
399, 413-14 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-69 (1992); see also Filarsky
v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1666-68 (2012) (noting the distinction between those
who work for the government and private individuals subject to liability under
Bivens and Section 1983, and according an expansive reading to the former
category).

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 68 Side A

159. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621-23 (2012) (describing the
historical trajectory of Bivens litigation and emphasizing the limited
circumstances in which liability under Bivens may lie—Fourth Amendment
violations, gender discrimination, and deliberate indifference to the medical
needs of prisoners).
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conduct was undertaken.166 The doctrine principally seeks to
avoid the over-deterrence of government actors,167 although
Professor John Jeffries, Jr., has persuasively demonstrated
that it also effectively functions as a safety valve that enables
legal development in the realm of constitutional tort without
the threat of burdensome damages judgments.168 Recent
Court decisions have repeatedly emphasized the doctrine’s
wide protective scope169 and insisted that courts define rights
at a very high level of specificity in ascertaining whether they
are “clearly established.”170 They also have acknowledged
that the doctrine is a judicial creation whose contours have
been developed—and will continue to evolve—with an eye
towards protecting the public interest.171
The story is similar with respect to the substitutionary
constitutional remedies of exclusion and the invalidation of
judgments; the availability of each type of remedy is
significantly circumscribed by judicially created doctrines
that can reduce the costs of constitutional innovation. As to
exclusion, one doctrine that limits the operation of the

166. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-19 (1982) (holding that qualified
immunity extends to all government “officials performing discretionary
functions . . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . .
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).

168. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA.
L. REV. 207 (2013) [hereinafter Jeffries, Constitutional Torts] (summarizing
arguments developed in John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh
Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 78-81 (1998), and Jeffries, RightRemedy Gap, supra note 37, at n.121).
169. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that qualified
immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”).
170. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
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171. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163 (1992) (acknowledging that
qualified immunity is not derived from the text of Section 1983 and that policy
considerations have shaped its development and implementation); Anderson, 483
U.S. at 644-45 (denying that the contours of the doctrine “can and should be
slavishly derived” from historical practices and understandings).
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167. See id. at 814-18 (explaining that the doctrine seeks to secure quicker
dismissals of doomed civil rights lawsuits so that officials will not be dissuaded
from vigorous performance of their duties by burdensome litigation).

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 69 Side A

10/09/2014 13:23:35

2014]

REMEDIAL DISCRETION

915

remedy—the holding in Davis v. United States172 prohibiting
the exclusion of evidence obtained from unconstitutional
searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on
binding judicial precedent—already has been discussed.173 To
similar effect are the rulings in United States v. Leon,174
Illinois v. Krull,175 Arizona v. Evans,176 Hudson v. Michigan,177
and Herring v. United States,178 all of which held that the
likely deterrent benefits of exclusion were outweighed by its
very significant social costs.179 Also, in Stone v. Powell, the
Court held that Fourth Amendment violations cannot
support the reversal of state criminal judgments on collateral
review where there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the claim in state court.180 Again, the Court reasoned that any
deterrent effect of exclusion was outweighed by the costs of
extending it to collateral review.181
As to the invalidation of judgments, the harmless-error
rule significantly limits the availability of relief for a properly
preserved claim of constitutional trial error advanced on
direct review. The doctrine insulates from invalidation
judgments shown by the government to have been unaffected
172. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
173. See supra Part I.C.
174. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (requiring admission of evidence obtained by police
officers who reasonably rely on a faulty warrant).

176. 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (requiring admission of evidence obtained by police
officers who reasonably rely on erroneous database information maintained by
judicial employees).
177. 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (requiring admission of evidence obtained by police
officers in violation of the “knock and announce” rule).
178. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (requiring admission of evidence obtained by police
officers through a merely negligent disregard of Fourth Amendment rights and
limiting exclusion to police conduct that is deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent—or that is traceable to recurring or systemic negligence—with respect
to Fourth Amendment rights).

180. 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976).
181. Id. at 489-95.
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179. See id. at 700-02; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591-94; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-16;
Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53; Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
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175. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (requiring admission of evidence obtained by police
officers who reasonably rely on a subsequently invalidated statute).
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182. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that there should
be no reversal if the government establishes “beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”). Subsequent
Court rulings have made clear that Chapman’s harmless-error rule applies only
to constitutional “trial error”—which describes most errors—and not to structural
error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10 (1991).
183. See supra Part I.B.
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by most constitutional errors identified by a reviewing
court.182 Moreover, if the litigant did not raise and properly
preserve the claim—a common scenario when the law is
settled against the defendant prior to a rights-expanding
constitutional ruling—the claim is forfeit and reversal is only
available pursuant to the discretionary and demanding
plain-error standard.183 These doctrines combine to provide
the judiciary with plenty of flexibility to advance legal
frontiers in the area of constitutional criminal procedure
without emptying the nation’s prisons.
On collateral review, the invalidation of a judgment on
the ground of constitutional trial error is even more difficult.
A person collaterally attacking a state court conviction on the
basis of a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court must
establish that the decision denying the claim was either
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,”184 or “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented.”185 The claimant must also establish that
the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict.”186 And to the extent that a
person seeks to bring a collateral challenge to a conviction on
the basis of favorable “new law”—i.e., a rights-expanding
decision that was handed down after the underlying
conviction became final—he or she must establish either that
the rule holds previously punishable conduct to be

184. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
186. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).

C M
Y K

10/09/2014 13:23:35

185. Id. § (d)(2).
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constitutionally protected,187 or that it implicates the
fundamental fairness of the trial and is necessary to prevent
a serious diminishment of the likelihood of an accurate
conviction.188 Obviously, all of these rules seek to promote
interests in efficiency, the finality of judgments, and (in the
case of collateral review) federalism in circumstances where,
in the view of the Supreme Court or Congress, such interests
outweigh the interests the underlying constitutional rights
seek to protect.
Contrast all of these doctrines applying public interest
balancing to limit the availability of substitutionary
constitutional remedies for wholly concluded constitutional
wrongs with what we see when we look at how the Supreme
Court has treated justiciable and properly raised claims for
specific constitutional remedies. With respect to such claims,
the Court has simply not developed remedy-limiting
doctrines rooted in public interest balancing. In fact, the only
limits the Court has recognized on the availability of specific
constitutional remedies are rooted in competing structural
imperatives of a constitutional dimension—those underlying,
for example, sovereign immunity,189 federalism based limits
on the federal judicial power,190 and the deference the Court
187. Note that this exception preserves the right to seek the one form of specific
relief available on collateral review. See supra notes 144 & 150 and accompanying
text.

190. Judicial federalism doctrines are grounded in both statutory and case law.
Examples of statutes enforcing judicial federalism principles include: the Tax
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189. Governmental immunity merely requires most plaintiffs to use a legal
fiction when a seeking a specific constitutional remedy for a justiciable and
meritorious claim: the “official capacity” claim. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S.
Ct. 1910 (2011) (entertaining action for specific relief on the basis of allegedly
unconstitutional prison overcrowding by state officials); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592 (1988) (entertaining action for specific relief on the basis of allegedly
unconstitutional discrimination by federal officials). A notable exception involves
claimants under a state contract that has been modified in violation of the
Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, who are not entitled to bring an official
capacity claim seeking specific performance of the contract. See LAYCOCK, supra
note 128, at 476. But such claimants are not left without a remedy; damage
caused by government impairment of a contract constitutes a taking for which
just compensation is required. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579
(1934).
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opinion); supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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shows to congressional prerogative with respect to
remedies191—that sometimes justify redirecting federal court
claimants with meritorious claims to alternative forums.
Indeed, in explaining its willingness to recognize such
structural limits on the availability of specific remedies with
respect to otherwise justiciable claims for relief from ongoing
constitutional harm, the Court has been at pains to
emphasize that “serious constitutional concerns” would be
raised if relief were unavailable from the alternative forum.192
Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (limiting federal court authority
to issue injunctions staying the collection of state taxes); the Johnson Act of 1934,
28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012) (limiting federal court authority to restrain operation of
public utility rates); and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012) (limiting
federal court authority to issue injunctions staying state court proceedings).
Examples of judicially created judicial federalism doctrines include Pullman
abstention, see R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (limiting federal
court authority to pass on the constitutionality of state enactments in certain
circumstances), and Younger abstention, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(limiting federal court authority to decide constitutional challenges that can be
raised in a pending state criminal prosecution).
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192. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1937 (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians,
476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (observing that legislation precluding judicial
review of a challenge seeking to strike down an allegedly unconstitutional
Medicare statute would raise a “serious constitutional question”) (collecting
supportive authority)); see e.g., Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012 n.15 (emphasizing that
the statutory remedy simply replaced the constitutional remedy and stating that
“[t]here is no issue here of Congress’ ability to preclude the federal courts from
granting a remedy for a constitutional deprivation”); cf. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1947
(stating that the ongoing violation of prison overcrowding “requires a remedy”).
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191. The Supreme Court has recognized congressional authority to divert
otherwise justiciable claims for specific constitutional relief into alternative
statutory or administrative enforcement regimes. See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep’t of the
Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012) (holding the Civil Service Reform Act,
5 U.S.C. § 1101, provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review to a federal
employee challenging an adverse employment action on constitutional grounds);
United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1 (2008) (detailing how
a taxpayer precluded from bringing a pre-enforcement challenge to a tax under
the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), and forced to pay an unlawful
federal tax must seek a refund administratively before suing the government
under the Tucker Act); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1994) (holding that the
Education of the Handicapped Act (now known as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, provides the exclusive avenue to
specific relief for allegedly unconstitutional discrimination); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding statute prohibiting a criminal defendant
from seeking nullification of law authorizing prosecution where he had
opportunity to challenge the law in a prior administrative proceeding).
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In other words, the Court has all but held that a claimant’s
entitlement to a remedy for an ongoing constitutional wrong
is itself of constitutional magnitude, and can only be trumped
when the underlying claim implicates competing structural
concerns that are also constitutional in dimension.
III. THE CASE FOR A PURELY REMEDIAL FRAMEWORK

A. A Justifiable Distinction
The Supreme Court’s differential treatment of
substitutionary and specific constitutional remedies in
fashioning remedy-limiting doctrines rests on firm

194. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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193. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
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Part II describes a pattern of judicial behavior implying
that the Constitution permits lawmakers to engage in public
interest balancing to create doctrines that limit the
availability of substitutionary, but not specific, constitutional
remedies. Part III defends this proposition normatively and
urges the Supreme Court to embrace it as a prescriptive
framework to guide Congress and the lower courts in
deciding whether and when it is appropriate to withhold
constitutional remedies. Part III then argues that the
framework is sufficient—and superior to the use of nonretroactivity doctrines—for managing the costs of
constitutional innovation. Finally, Part III contends that the
framework explains why the Court correctly reached two
conclusions that have been criticized by the prominent and
influential commentators who edit the Hart & Wechsler
federal courts casebook: first, that just compensation for
takings and relief for the imposition of unconstitutional taxes
are constitutionally required, even though invasions of
liberty interests often go without a remedy; and second, that
the ban on prospective constitutional rulings established in
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde193 coheres with doctrines,
such as qualified immunity and the rule of Teague v. Lane,194
that make legal novelty a legitimate basis for denying relief
to victims of unconstitutional conduct.
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constitutional footing and tracks an appropriate
constitutional boundary.195 Substitutionary constitutional
remedies—i.e., damages, the exclusion of evidence, and the
invalidation of tainted judgments—are pervasively and
properly conceptualized as both sub-constitutional and
contingent. To the extent that they are not rooted in statutes
or rules,196 they derive from judicial lawmaking with no clear
or inevitable link to the text or structure of the
Constitution.197
To be sure, substitutionary constitutional remedies are
central components of our constitutional order; their
wholesale elimination without replacement certainly would
yield an undesirable level of constitutional underenforcement.198 But by their very nature, substitutionary
constitutional remedies are highly imperfect stand-ins. They
typically apply only to the wholly concluded discretionary
actions of those individuals to whom a modern society must
entrust the complex operation of government;199 they fail to
halt, prevent, or undo the constitutional harms to which they
195. See Greabe, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 22, 892-96 (previewing
this argument).
196. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).

199. See supra Part II.B.
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198. For this reason, I have argued for a conception of substitutionary
constitutional remedies that regards them as “integral as a class” but
“individually contingent” and “susceptible to legislative or judicial expansion,
contraction, or replacement as the perceived public interest dictates.” Greabe,
Constitutional Remedies, supra note 22, at 893.

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 71 Side B

197. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (positing the existence of “constitutional common law,”
described as a “substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various
constitutional provisions”). Professor Monaghan regarded as constitutional
common law the exclusionary rule, see id. at 3-10, the implied Bivens damages
remedy, see id. at 23-24, and the Chapman harmless-error rule, see Henry P.
Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 SUP. CT. REV.
195, 200 n.30. Other prominent commentators agree. See, e.g., Jeffries,
Constitutional Torts, supra note 168, at 242-43 (describing constitutional tort
remedies as sub-constitutional); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and
Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1994) (comparing the
Chapman rule with the Bivens rule and arguing that both are at least partially
sub-constitutional). Needless to say, I agree with these characterizations.
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respond;200 and, most importantly—and this is unique to
substitutionary constitutional remedies—they can generate
significant and controversial collateral costs that must be
borne entirely by third parties whose only link to the case is
that they live within or near the polity that employed the
offending government agent.201 If the whole of the law of
remedies is “a jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is lost
between declaring a right and implementing a remedy,”202 the
imperfections and costs of judicial remedies are perhaps most
prominently on display when the only remedy available for a
constitutional infraction is some form of substitutionary
relief.
Specific constitutional remedies for rights-invasions are
of a materially different, and less problematic, character. By
their very nature, they provide more narrowly tailored relief
in that they provide or restore to the right-holder the precise
interest that the government has wrongly compromised.
Their links to the text and structure of the Constitution are
more direct, for they are more conceptually necessary to the
maintenance of a federalist structure with a Supremacy
Clause203 and government power separated into three coequal
federal branches including a judicial department entrusted
with judicial review.204 The Constitution explicitly

201. Cf. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) (“The criminal
is to go free because the constable has blundered.”). The problem of transferred
costs to innocent third parties is not confined to the costs borne by crime victims
and communities when the exclusionary rule operates to free a criminal
defendant. Innocent third parties who merely live within the polity also
ultimately bear the costs for both damages judgments imposed for constitutional
torts and repeating judicial proceedings tainted by constitutional trial error.
Little wonder, then, that substitutionary constitutional remedies are less popular
outside of the legal academy than inside.
202. Paul Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983).
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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204. Recently, the Supreme Court has reminded us that the use of judicial
review to enforce constitutional structure is necessary to protect individual
liberty. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012)
(“By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of
public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”)
(quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)). But we must not
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lose sight of the converse proposition: that the use of judicial review to enforce
individual rights also is necessary to enforce appropriate constitutional structure.
205. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
206. See supra Part II.B.

208. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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207. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”); id. at 177 (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each.”).
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contemplates habeas corpus petitions and the provision of
just compensation for takings,205 and other specific
constitutional remedies are all but logically compelled once
we recall that they ameliorate ongoing unconstitutional
conduct at the lawmaking level206 and accept that the
judiciary should—when faced with a justiciable and properly
raised claim challenging an unconstitutional law—exercise
its power to keep the coordinate federal branches and the
States within constitutional bounds.207
A prescriptive framework for withholding constitutional
remedies, grounded in constitutional structure and limits,
thus emerges. The Supreme Court and Congress are free, in
the exercise of their sub-constitutional lawmaking powers,208
to take the perceived public interest into account to fashion,
alter, and (hopefully) improve those doctrines—immunity
rules, exceptions to the exclusionary rule, harmless-error
rules, and limitations on the availability of collateral relief—
that operate to withhold substitutionary constitutional
remedies for wholly concluded constitutional wrongs. The
power to generate and modify such remedy-limiting doctrines
is a lesser-included component of the broader lawmaking
power by which the Court and Congress create
substitutionary constitutional remedies in the first place.
Yet, the Court and Congress are not free to withhold
specific
constitutional
remedies
that
invalidate
unconstitutional laws (broadly defined to include all
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unconstitutional government custom and policy) through
properly raised, justiciable, and meritorious claims that are
filed in a proper forum against a proper defendant. The
availability of specific constitutional remedies to ameliorate
ongoing constitutional violations is critical to the judiciary’s
role in maintaining our separation of powers and enforcing
federalism
values.
Judgments
ordering
specific
constitutional remedies are the principal means by which the
judiciary keeps the political branches at the federal and state
levels within constitutional limits with respect to lawmaking.
Judges should not view themselves as free to withhold such
judgments out of concerns about how they might affect the
public interest. Unconstitutional laws should be struck down,
either facially or as applied, whenever challenged by means
of an otherwise justiciable and proper claim brought in an
appropriate forum.
B. The Sufficiency and Superiority of a Purely RemedyLimiting Framework

210. See Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 26, at 979-90.
211. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 610-21.
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209. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 621-25; Heytens, Managing
Transitional Moments, supra note 26, at 983-90; see also Fallon & Meltzer, New
Law, supra note 19, at 1807-13 (arguing for the use of selective prospectivity to
manage the costs of legal change on direct review of criminal convictions).
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Professor Heytens has joined Professors Fallon and
Meltzer and twice called for a revival of non-retroactivity
jurisprudence—specifically, selective prospectivity—to serve
as a vehicle by which courts should manage the costs of legal
change on direct review of criminal convictions.209 In his first
paper, Professor Heytens contrasts the relative virtues of
selective prospectivity with the formalism and arbitrariness
of the Court’s forfeiture doctrine, which places nearly
dispositive weight on whether a criminal defendant has
objected—and thus preserved appellate rights—with respect
to the issue on which the law has changed.210 In his more
recent paper, Professor Heytens expands his analysis to
include consideration of a remedy-limiting approach.211 But
in the end, he concludes that such an approach—while
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superior to the use of forfeiture—is inadequate to help courts
manage of the costs of legal change in all direct review
cases.212
This conclusion is informed by an understanding that,
even with all of its warts,213 selective prospectivity is
available in all circumstances to ameliorate the costs and
disruption of a law-changing decision.214 By contrast,
Professor Heytens argues, a remedy-limiting approach of the
sort employed in Davis v. United States,215 is only available in
cases where the requested remedy (the exclusion of evidence
at trial) is separable from the underlying right (freedom from
a wholly concluded unreasonable search) that has been
violated.216 To be sure, Professor Heytens recognizes that
there are other remedy-limiting doctrines, such as harmless
error, that can operate to withhold remedies217 even for
constitutional trial rights where some specified procedure is
part and parcel of the right.218 But, he says, “any expansion
of the remedy-limiting approach [to cover all situations
involving constitutional criminal procedure rights] would
require the Court to think hard about the relationship—and
the distinction—between various ‘rights’ and ‘remedies,’ as
212. See id. at 614-21.

214. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 621-24.
215. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); see supra Part I.C.
216. See Heytens, Framework(s), supra note 26, at 614-21 (arguing that Fourth
Amendment cases and cases like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
involving merely “prophylactic” constitutional rules, are the only situations in
which the Court has authorized the separation of right and remedy in rightspecific contexts).
217. See id. at 616 (acknowledging that the harmless-error doctrine relies on a
distinction between rights and remedies).
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218. See id. at 619 (listing the rights to exclusion of out-of-court “testimonial”
statements, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and to a jury
determination of facts that raise the penalty above the statutory maximum, see
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), as examples of rights that carry
along certain procedural guarantees that, unlike Fourth Amendment rights, must
be vindicated at trial).
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213. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (summarizing the Supreme
Court’s view, expressed in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), that selective
prospectivity is both unconstitutionally “legislative,” id. at 322, and violates the
norm that similarly situated parties be treated similarly, id. at 323).
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219. Id. at 616.
220. See id. at 621 (admitting “that a nonretroactivity approach is [not] without
its problems”).
221. See supra Part I.A.
222. See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for
the Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What It
Might, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1677, 1680-83 (2007).
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223. Id. at 1685 n.48 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Method of Philosophy,
Address Delivered in the William L. Storrs Lecture Series Before the Law School
of Yale University (1921), in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Dec. 1921,
at 33 (“It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of
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well as the source and scope of its discretion to grant or
withhold certain remedies.”219
I fully agree with the quoted statement. But I think that
it would be better for the Supreme Court to think these issues
through—and to explain the source and scope of judicial
discretion to grant and withhold some but not all
constitutional remedies—than for it to resort to the
acknowledged lesser evil220 of reviving the strand of nonretroactivity jurisprudence known as selective prospectivity.
For the problems with selective prospectivity are significant
indeed.
One does not need to be a Blackstonian to believe that
the Court enhances both its stature as a legal institution and
the legitimacy of its constitutional rulings by treating its acts
of constitutional judging as declarations of its best
understanding of what the Constitution “means,” and not as
mere acts of constitutional lawmaking emanating from the
persons who then happen to hold commissions as Supreme
Court justices. As Professor Roosevelt has explained, under a
declaratory theory, the Court commands obedience to “the
law.” But under the Justices-as-sources-of-law theory, on
which non-retroactivity jurisprudence depends,221 the Court
only commands obedience to, at best, an institution and, at
worst, a collection of individuals who presently hold judicial
power.222 Moreover, the differential treatment of identically
situated individuals occasioned by selective prospectivity
disregards one of most basic imperatives of justice—that
identically situated individuals be treated equally under the
law.223 For both of these reasons, the Court has quite properly
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litigants and the opposite way between another.”)); see, e.g., id. at 1684
(expressing “surprise[] that Stovall’s ‘selective prospectivity’ is not more widely
considered an abomination”).
224. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) (explaining that
prospective rulings are quintessentially legislative and violate the principle of
treating similarly situated parties the same).
225. See supra Part III.A.
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characterized the issuance of non-retroactive constitutional
rulings as doubly incompatible with the norms of
adjudication under Article III.224
In contrast, a framework that differentiates between
claims for substitutionary and specific constitutional
remedies permits the Court to use public interest balancing
to generate and refine remedy-withholding doctrines in all
circumstances that the Constitution permits, but in only
those circumstances that the Constitution permits—i.e., in
connection with all properly preserved and advanced claims
for substitutionary constitutional remedies to address wholly
realized constitutional wrongs, but not in connection with
claims for specific constitutional remedies to ameliorate
ongoing constitutional violations rooted in government
custom or policy.225 Non-retroactivity doctrines such as
selective prospectivity contain no such limiting principle.
Theoretically, such doctrines could be applied to withhold the
specific constitutional remedies that are ordinarily
necessary: those sought in connection with ongoing wrongs
rooted in government custom or policy.226
All of this is not to say, of course, that the Supreme Court
has gotten everything right with respect to the metes and
bounds of the remedy-limiting doctrines that it has developed
and applied to claims for substitutionary constitutional
relief. Indeed, in the past I have argued that the Court should
embrace less capacious concepts of harmless error with
respect to instructional errors that interfere with the jury’s
fact-finding function,227 and of “good faith” in formulating

226. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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227. See John M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record? Harmless-Error
Review of Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions,
74 B.U. L. REV. 819 (1994).
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exceptions to the exclusionary rule.228 I also have argued that
the Court should reform its qualified immunity doctrine in a
number of respects,229 and I agree with Professor John
Jeffries, Jr., that constitutional tort law should be rerationalized and revamped with an eye towards enhancing
context-specific functionality.230 Finally, I believe that there
is much to commend in Professor Heytens’ argument that the
Court should improve upon its approach to cases involving
direct review of criminal convictions infected by
constitutional errors to which defendants’ counsel—relying
on the soundness of law that became obsolete on appeal—did
not interpose objections at trial and thus preserve their
appellate rights.231 My point is simply that the Court should
use a purely remedial framework—and not selective
prospectivity or any other non-retroactivity doctrine—to

228. See John M. Greabe, Objecting at the Altar: Why the Herring Good Faith
Principle and the Harlow Qualified Immunity Doctrine Should Not be Married,
112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/1_Greabe.pdf.
229. See John M. Greabe, A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 189 (2009); John M. Greabe, Iqbal, al-Kidd and Pleading Past
Qualified Immunity: What the Cases Mean and How They Demonstrate a Need to
Eliminate the Immunity Doctrines from Constitutional Tort Law, 20 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1 (2011); Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!, supra note 28.
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231. See Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 26, at 955-59.
My own preliminary view is that courts ordinarily should exercise their Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) discretion to reverse the convictions of
defendants who, on direct review, can establish the harmfulness under ordinary
harmless-error principles of an error whose existence only became apparent after
a post-conviction change in the law. Shifting the burden of persuasion from the
government to defendants who have not preserved the issue fairly differentiates
between those who have preserved their rights and those who have not. Moreover,
establishing the harmfulness of an error under standard harmless-error review—
which requires raising a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been
different but for the error, see, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)—
is no mean feat. Such a rule would result in the vacatur of judgments only in those
cases where the trial’s outcome was quite possibly affected by the error. This
would doubtless be a small minority of cases under prevailing harmless-error
principles.
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230. See Jeffries, supra note 168, passim (arguing for the pruning of absolute
immunity with an eye to the availability of alternative remedies, the elimination
of strict municipal liability, and the reform of qualified immunity to make
immunity less robust and liability more routine).
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233. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-66 (1980), superseded by statute,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
234. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).
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232. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-617 (1982).
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protect the public interest from the costs of constitutional
innovation.
A final point should be addressed. One might ask if it
matters whether courts explicitly claim a power to issue nonretroactive rulings. So long as courts do not withhold
remedies from parties who establish an ongoing
constitutional violation rooted in unlawful custom and policy
by means of a proper and justiciable claim—and this Article
shows that they in fact do not—why should we care whether
courts use a non-retroactivity doctrine or a remedy-limiting
approach in those cases where they do (properly) withhold
remedies? In other words, why should we care about the
justification courts provide for withholding remedies in
circumstances where a remedy is not constitutionally
required?
The answer is that, if we care about the rule of law, both
the means and ends must matter when courts exercise the
profound, counter-majoritarian power of judicial review. The
rule of law is why it is unconstitutional to maintain an atlarge election district with discriminatory effects on election
outcomes for discriminatory purposes,232 but constitutional to
maintain such a district for non-discriminatory purposes.233
Similarly, the rule of law is why a state may constitutionally
decline to apply the wrongful death statute of a sister state
in a particular case, but may not adopt a blanket rule stating
that it will never enforce the wrongful death statutes of other
states.234 In short, the rule of law requires that we care about
more than the constitutionality of outcomes of government
actions. The rule of law also demands that those outcomes be
reached by constitutionally permissible means.
As explained above, the issuance of non-retroactive
rulings through a regime of selective prospectivity is more
akin to the creation of legislation than it is to a judicial
pronouncement on the meaning of a legal text. Moreover, the
issuance of non-retroactive rulings through a regime of
selective prospectivity results in similarly situated litigants
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being treated differently without an adequate justification.
Both reasons are sufficient to justify a prohibition on the
practice as a means for reducing the costs of constitutional
innovation.
C. The Coherence of the Supreme Court’s Approach

235. See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 19 at 741.
236. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987).
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As mentioned in the Introduction, the editors of the Hart
& Wechsler federal courts casebook have suggested that the
Supreme Court has acted inconsistently in developing
doctrines that operate to withhold constitutional remedies.235
They imply that the Court has improperly discriminated in
favor of (less important) property rights by mandating just
compensation for takings,236 and remedies for the imposition
of unconstitutional taxes,237 while simultaneously developing
remedy-limiting doctrines—e.g., qualified immunity,
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and harmless-error
principles—that operate to withhold relief for invasions of
(more important) liberty interests.238 But as should by now be
clear, this criticism overlooks the fact that, unlike damages
for the invasion of a liberty interest, just compensation for a
taking and relief for the imposition of an unconstitutional tax
are specific remedies that provide or restore to the rightholder the very interest against which the Constitution
serves as a shield. The necessity of a constitutional remedy
has never turned on the perceived importance of the right
that has been compromised; as explained above, it has turned
on the nature of the constitutional deprivation—ongoing or
wholly concluded—and a court’s capacity to provide an
appropriate remedy for the violation. Courts cannot undo the
past.
Similarly, and for similar reasons, it is perfectly coherent
for the Court to reject non-retroactivity doctrines while at the

237. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1994).
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238. See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 741; see also
Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, supra note 19, at 1827-28 (making the argument
explicitly).
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239. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
240. See FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 721-23.
241. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
242. In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894
(1988), the Supreme Court struck down the statute because it effectively gave
Ohio tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state)
defendants.
243. Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 751-52 (quoting the syllabus of the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision).
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244. See id. at 751.
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same time enforcing other remedial doctrines—e.g., qualified
immunity and the rule adopted in Teague v. Lane239—that
make legal novelty a basis for denying relief.240 Because this
is precisely what the Court did in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v.
Hyde,241 I shall re-rationalize the holding in that case in terms
of the framework for withholding constitutional remedies
that this Article proposes.
Reynoldsville Casket involved whether the Ohio Supreme
Court lawfully applied an unconstitutional state “tolling”
statute in favor of a plaintiff who sued after the statute of
limitations had run, but before the United States Supreme
Court struck down the tolling statute on dormant commerce
clause grounds.242 The Ohio Supreme Court applied the
tolling statute—notwithstanding its unconstitutionality—in
a cryptic decision that relied on the Ohio Constitution to hold
that the United States Supreme Court decision declaring the
statute unconstitutional “may not be retroactively applied to
bar claims in state courts which had accrued prior to the
announcement of that decision.”243 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the obligation to apply
constitutional rulings retroactively is enforceable through
the Supremacy Clause.244 Further, it also unambiguously
reiterated that law-changing rulings should not be given
merely prospective effect in pending cases.245
For present purposes, what is most interesting is how the
Supreme Court disposed of the plaintiff’s “ingenious[]”
argument246 that the non-retroactivity principle adopted by

245. See id. at 752-53.
246. Id. at 752.
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247. See Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 757-58.
249. See id. at 758.
250. See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 721-23.
251. See Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 750-53.
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248. See id.

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 77 Side A

the Ohio Supreme Court could and should be characterized
as a mere remedy-limiting doctrine—analogous to qualified
immunity and the rule adopted in Teague v. Lane—that
lawfully could apply because the plaintiff had filed suit in
reliance on the tolling statute.247 The Court rejected the
argument by stating that qualified immunity and the Teague
principle are animated by concerns unrelated to mere
reliance interests: the over-deterrence of police officers in the
case of qualified immunity,248 and a limitation inherent in
retroactivity itself—one based in special concerns about the
finality of criminal convictions—in the case of Teague.249
The editors of the Hart & Wechsler federal courts
casebook make an excellent point in asking whether the
Supreme Court has adequately explained itself.250 After all,
to the extent that avoiding the over-deterrence of police
officers and preserving the finality of all but the most
troubling state criminal convictions serve to justify the
Court’s creation of the remedy-withholding qualified
immunity and Teague doctrines, why should the reliance
interest to which the Ohio Supreme Court pointed not
similarly suffice to justify the creation of a similar “reliance”
doctrine to benefit the Reynoldsville Casket plaintiff? The
Court provides no convincing answer to this question.
But the framework proposed by this Article supplies the
missing rationale and establishes the correctness of the
Reynoldsville Casket holding. The key is to understand that
the rule adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court would have
withheld from the defendant a specific constitutional remedy
addressed to a violation of law rooted in unlawful custom or
policy: dismissal of the lawsuit on grounds of the defendant’s
ongoing entitlement not to be treated in an
unconstitutionally discriminatory manner with respect to
application of the state’s statute of limitations.251 The
opponent’s reliance interests simply should not trump a
party’s entitlement to specific relief from the burdens of a
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law, rooted in custom or policy, that is unconstitutional either
on its face or as applied to an appropriate claimant.
CONCLUSION
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It is telling to take a functional look at what the Supreme
Court has done in developing and refining doctrines that
withhold remedies for justiciable and meritorious
constitutional claims. The Court’s de facto but unrationalized approach has been to limit itself to the
development and modification of doctrines that withhold only
substitutionary remedies for those constitutional interests
irretrievably lost through wholly concluded constitutional
violations. But when a specific constitutional remedy is
available, and when a party seeks such a remedy by means
of a properly raised, justiciable, and meritorious claim filed
against a proper defendant in a proper forum, the Court has
regarded the provision or restoration of the compromised
interest as mandatory.
This is as it should be. As I have explained, the Supreme
Court’s remedy-limiting approach traces an appropriate
constitutional boundary and supplies a workable framework
that courts can use to decide whether and when it is
appropriate to protect the public interest by withholding a
constitutional remedy. And unlike non-retroactivity
doctrines—the principal theoretical competitors when it
comes to techniques that the Court has used to withhold
remedies from parties with properly preserved and advanced
constitutional claims—a purely remedy-limiting approach
honors the requirements of Article III and otherwise serves
structural values. Although the Court should take a hard
look at the scope and breadth of its various remedy-limiting
doctrines, it should continue to use a purely remedy-limiting
framework to withhold remedies—to manage the costs of
constitutional innovation or for any other purpose. But it is
high time for the Court to explain what it has been doing.
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